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EMU CRISIS CREATES REGIONAL GROUPINGS: ARE BALKAN COUNTRIES CHALLENGED BY THAT? 
 
A B S T R A C T 
 
Together with the IMF and the World Bank, the EMU is the biggest monetary project in the 
history of mankind. Its goals are reduction of trade costs between its member-states, increase in the 
convergence in their relations and their economic growth. The main pillars of the monetary institutions 
were set up for its normal operation. However, the member-countries kept their fiscal sovereignty. The 
EMU was not a part of a larger political integration of the member-countries. It enabled them to make 
political decisions on a national level which were not in line with the so-called Maastricht criteria. The 
outcome of the lack of a political union is: growing budget deficits and continuing growth of the public 
debt of most of the member-states of the EMU. A debt crisis was created which shakes the basis not 
only of the EMU but also of the EU. For the first time in its six and a half decade existence, the EU faces 
an existential crisis. The exit of this condition lies in redesigning of the basic structures on which it 
stands. This process might be fatal, as well as painful for the EU. In such situation, the Balkan aspiring 
member-states will have to wait longer to enter the union. In the meantime, to protect their national 
economic and political tissue, as well as to prepare for the accession in the EU, a regional cooperation 
and union is a necessity. A Balkan Economic Union in which Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, Turkey and Macedonia will be a part will help in achieving the goal of entering the 
EU less painfully, and the Balkan, at last to stop being the “gunpowder barrel”. With application of a 
quality, historic, comparative and descriptive method, this paper presents the possibilities and 
opportunities of this model of designing a political and economic picture of the Balkan. The aim of this 
paper is to show that with such a union, the Balkan countries have a serious chance to overcome, still, 
the prevalent antagonisms and thus clear the way to their final destination – the EU.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
A basic idea of an integration of Europe was born after World War II. The leading ideologists of 
the time estimated that the piled nationalisms, which in the past had turned Europe into an arena for 
various wars, should be eliminated so as to establish some sort of integration between different 
European nations and peoples. Over time, this noble idea grew into an idea of establishing 
multiculturalism as a foundation for future establishment of Europe. 
The conclusion of the Second World War, the division of Germany, the economic and political 
crisis in Western Europe and the beginning of the cold war in the early 1950's presented the European 
integration as a direction of economic and political reconstruction of western Europe. That was the true 
beginning of the process of European integration, which has been lasting for nearly six and a half 
decades, during which the process itself altered and adjusted to the changes in the globalized world. 
The strongest change occurred in the early 1990s with the establishment of the pillars of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). But then, the European Union (EU) perhaps made the only major 
mistake that threatens to ruin the idea of a united Europe today. Despite the deviation in monetary 
unity, member states of EMU have kept their fiscal unity. Monetary political integration was established. 
It created an opportunity for Member States at national level to adopt measures that do not match the 
Maastricht criteria, i.e. the pillars of EMU. The result of this was the growing budget deficits and the 
public debts of most members of EMU. In this respect, their self-mindedness conditioned that the EU 
face an existential crisis for the first time in its 6.5 decades of esistence. 
The way out of this crisis probably is possible. But definitely it will be neither easy nor fast. This 
means that the joining of aspiring EU member candidates (including the Republic of Macedonia) will 
continue to be left on hold without a clear perspective about when the door will be opened again. 
Hence the question arises: whether the Western Balkans will patiently await for the moment of opening 
the EU gate at some time in the future, near or distant, or whether they should be organized in a 
manner that will provide protection from adverse trends in the EMU, as well as foster their economic 
prosperity and higher-quality preparation for entering the EU. 
If the events in different parts of Europe where there are intensive separate groupings of 
countries (Visegrad, Nordic, Baltic, Eurasian, etc.) were to be analyzed, the positive response should be 
located in the second part of that question. Following the example of those groups, the Western Balkans 
(Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, with an option of the 
joining of Turkey) should proceed to their economic integration in the way that it will not only enable 
economic prosperity and protection from possible future adverse movement in the EMU, but also 
contribute to replacement of the politics in the region with economy, thus preventing the association of 
the Western Balkans with the term "gunpowder barrel". 
By presenting the general ideas, goals, development, crisis and prospects of the EU, the 
objective of this paper is to present the needs and possibilities of forming Balkan Economic Union as the 
predecessor of the membership of other countries of the Western Balkans in the EU. Using a qualitative, 
historical, comparative and descriptive method, the paper will present opportunities for the design and 
implementation of a future economic community of the Western Balkans. The final conclusion of the 
analysis will be that those countries have a serious chance to overcome their mutual antagonizms and 
thus, economically stronger, to clean up the way to their final destination - the EU! 
 
2. Idea, goals, development, problems and prospects of the EU 
 
The fundations the EU that we know today were set in 1950's. It was the period when six 
developed European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) decided 
to establish a European community, which in some way would be the counterpart of the USA and would 
assume the obligation to establish an international political and economic balance. 
In fact, the basic idea of a European integration is much older. Immediately after the First World 
War an idea (Pushkaric, 2012) was born, according to which the crowded nationalisms, which in the past 
had turned Europe into an arena for running various wars, should be eliminated so as to establish some 
sort of integration between different European nations and peoples. Moreover, over the development 
of that idea politicians from certain Western European countries, as well as leading political institutions 
of the West, were increasingly developing the idea of establishing multiculturalism as a foundation for 
future European unity, which after the Second World War the English Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
called "United States of Europe" (Pushkaric, 2012).  
Hence, we can say that there is a centennial inspiration, tendency and desire to pave the way to 
the creation of the European integrity, and thus of European identity. 
This idea was developed throughout the second half of the 20th century. The European 
integration evolved over the years, gaining new forms that were supposed to act towards the removal of 
all emerging problems and realization of the envisioned perspectives. Since it was becoming more and 
more obvious that without economic integration, the ideas for achieving multiculturalism, economic 
prosperity and a single European identity were not possible, in the early 1990s the EU implemented the 
second largest monetary project in human history - the establishment of EMU. 
EMU rests on three main pillars (also called Maastricht criteria): a) the budget deficit of a 
Member State of the EMU must not be greater than 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), b) 
the rate of inflation in the Euro-zone is not greater than 2 percent annually, and c) the public debt of a 
member-country of EMU is not greater than 60 percent of its GDP. Following these criteria, EMU should 
be a vanguard of the future overall unification of Europe. 
 
3. EMU as a basis for economic prosperity and European integrity and identity 
 
The establishment of EMU and the introduction of the Euro as common currency (along with the 
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions - the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) are 
the largest monetary projects in the history of mankind (Nenovski, 2002). At first it united about 300 
million people from the wealthy Western European countries, with a tendency to expand with other 
member states, which meant a market of more than 500 million people. It was conceived as the 
vanguard of the future, not only economic, but political integration of Europe. In fact, it represents the 
counterpart of the US economic and political federation, as well as the relevant economic associations, 
such as the North American Free Trade Area - NAFTA. It combines different economies and their 
currencies, which are at the top of the world rankings. Therefore, there are a lot of high expectations of 
the common West European currency - the Euro. 
 
3.1. Benefits of EMU: cost reduction, trade increase 
 
In order to ease the financial life, at the beginning the 12, and today 17 Western European 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, 
Ireland, Finland, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia) have joined the EMU, which has only one 
currency - the Euro. Using a common currency was projected to save money and time, and 
simultaneously increase trade between those countries. 
The greatest advantage of the introduction of the Euro was lowering the cost of trading. These 
are costs that importers must pay while exchanging domestic for foreign currency in banks, for payment 
of obligations to foreign partners. During the introduction of the Euro (1 January 1999), the European 
Commission (EC) estimated that those transaction costs amounted to about 0.5 percent of the gross 
domestic product of Member States of the EMU. 
The one-for-all currency has contributed to reducing uncertainty about future exchange rates of 
the currencies of the Member States. Although, major adjustments to their exchange rates were not 
common even before, the previous system allowed some daily exchange rates variability. It gave rise to 
the uncertainty about the future value of a particular currency, and thus risk for importers and 
exporters. Therefore the risk of exchange rate trade depleted to a certain degree because of the 
introduction of the hidden transaction costs. The single currency eliminated that risk and thereby 
increased trade and the positive results that stem from it. These results revealed an increase in the 
range of products traded and the decline in prices due to increased competition by market expansion. 
 The following advantage of the introduction of the Euro was preventing member countries to 
devalue their currencies in order to increase exports. Previously, a country could devalue its currency to 
boost exports. For its own protection, its trading partners could devalue their currencies. This 
phenomenon, which was common in the past, according to Nenovski (2002) is known as competitive 
devaluation. Any reduction in the value of a currency has inflationary tendencies, which means that 
competitive devaluations could trigger inflation spiral (Nenovski, 2002). Although the former regime of 
exchange rates in the EU was so designed that eliminated the competitive devaluations, however, such 
devaluations were possible given the large number of currencies whose rates have often been set more 
by policy makers than the market itself. 
Thus, competitive devaluations bring profits for some, and loss of other countries. However, the 
cumulative economic impact of competitive devaluations of the Member States of the EMU would be 
negative, even catastrophic, if it comes to the so-called devaluation spiral (devaluation of a currency in 
response to a previously performed devaluation in another currency). The single currency within EMU 
eliminates the danger of such a mutual competition of the Member States of the Union. 
Besides these primary advantages, the introduction of the euro has a secondary, but very 
important advantage - preventing speculative attacks. Since the former European mechanism of 
exchange rates allowed large, though not frequent adjustments, it could be vulnerable to speculative 
attacks. If speculators believe that the value of a currency will decrease (to depreciate relatively to other 
European currencies), they will sell the values that they have in that currency. If it was believed by a 
large number of speculators, confidence in the value of that currency could collapse and cause for even 
the appropriate government to devalue its currency, though there was no intention or need. 
Indeed, in this case the government may have played speculators by raising interest rates and 
thereby caused the return of values denominated in that currency on the money markets and capital 
markets. However, there is a lower limit to which it can be done, because higher interest rates cause 
enterprises to face large interest costs, which would make them borrow less and less and consequently 
invest less and less, which in turn basically means slowing down economic growth. The introduction of 
the Euro completely eliminated opportunities for such speculative activities. 
 
3.2. Weaknesses of EMU: no autonomous monetary policy 
 Since the introduction of the Euro eliminated uncertainty about exchange rates, interest rates 
declined. It impacted on encouraging investment and on economic growth within surrounding EMU. 
That, in turn, encouraged excessive borrowing by individual Member States, which led to the emergence 
of a debt crisis because the fall in interest rates in Southern Europe has encouraged countries such as 
Italy and Greece to create an excessive debt (Biznis, 2011). Anyway, this is one reason why in the current 
discussions more commonly the Euro is determined as one of the causes of the current debt crisis and 
contributes to its enhancement. 
By accepting the Euro, Member States of EMU gave up the use of their own monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy of their national currency for impact on the economy and for overcoming potential 
problems in improving the national economy. They gave in the control over monetary policy to the 
European Central Bank, which sets out the general interest rates. Considering the previously eliminated 
barriers to international transfer of capital and highly developed and competitive financial markets 
among the Member States of EMU, interest rates, even before the introduction of the Euro, do not 
differ much from country to country. However, it is important that no uniform (in a way) European 
interest rates were determined by the major European countries. This implies that smaller Member 
States did have neither the opportunity nor the power to influence the reduction of interest rates in the 
periods of their economic slump. Finally, no Member State can adjust its exchange rate against the 
exchange rates of currencies of other Member States. In other words, the European agreement almost 
completely eliminates the possibility of smaller Members Countries to conduct an independent 
monetary policy in the future (Nenovski, 2002). 
What will be the victim of cancellation of its own independent monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy depend on the types of macroeconomic "shocks" that the national economy will eventually 
be exposed to, and also on how good the mechanisms for their cushioning or compensation are. 
At the start of the introduction of the euro the question was raised: what will happen if any of 
the member states of Euroland slides into recession? Until then there was the opportunity for the 
respective central bank to influence the recession by increasing the money supply, thus reducing 
interest rates and increased investment, which ultimate effect would heal the economy. The grounds on 
which the European Central Bank is set do (did) not allow it to lead expansionary monetary policy for 
helping a member state, because such an action would cause inflation in other member countries which 
are not in recession. 
In such a situation, in order to reduce interest rates, the member state in recession could use its 
fiscal policy to boost the economy. However, larger and lasting fiscal borrowings which may be used by 
one or more member states, will cause increased costs for all other members of the EMU by increasing 
repression against the general interest rates or by forcing the European Central Bank to increase money 
supply in order to avoid a rise in interest rates, which ultimately will increase the risk of inflation. To 
prevent this, the member states of EMU agreed to limit the use of their own fiscal policies. Under such 
agreement (not solid, binding contract) any member state of EMU must (had to) stop its annual budget 
deficit to exceed 3 percent of its GDP. Otherwise, the member state must (had to) pay substantial 
penalties to other states. It is (was) considered that each member state is denied the chance to use 
supportive fiscal policy during recessions. 
 
3.3. Antirecession solutions (opportunities) 
   
Then what would be the exit if the country fell into recession? 
The rate of release of any country out of recession depends mostly on the flexibility of European 
labor market. If workers are highly mobile, unemployed and with low incomes in the country which 
went into recession they will work in another country - a member of EMU. Such mobility would balance 
the effects across the EMU and establish greater symmetry in the objectives of its overall economic 
policy. However, in western Europe there are strong cultural and linguistic differences that restrict the 
international movement of labor, so that in the so-defined flexibility in the movement of labor (at least 
in the near future) may not be the salvation for the member country in recession. 
The second saving solution for the member country in recession would be the adjustment of 
wages. If during the recession, workers are willing to accept lower wages, employers will not only retain 
the same number of employees, but through reduced expenditure on wages they will decrease prices. 
Lower prices will encourage exports and consumption of domestic products, which all together would 
lead to economic prosperity of the country concerned. However, worldwide experience confirms that 
despite the rise during the economic rise, wages do not fall during the economic recession. Moreover, 
economic and social analyzes show that Western workers are more willing to remain unemployed rather 
than accept lower wages!? 
The third solution would be competitive devaluation of the domestic currency. However, the 
only currency does not exclude the possibility that Italy and other countries have used the Second World 
War when faced with huge debt: permitting inflation and devaluation of domestic currencies. Despite 
this, now another solution is possible, but the price is high. It is conducting "internal devaluation" 
(known as a reduction of wages and mass unemployment) that are now required for Italy, Greece and 
other European countries in debt (Biznis, 2011). 
Obviously there are serious reasons that could confirm the estimation that the introduction of 
the single currency increased asymetry between the member countries of the EMU. Because of the 
many differences between their economies, the appearance of certain asymmetric shocks, particularly 
in the area of demand or in production of some individual products is quite often. Faced with such 
shocks, some of the countries - members of the EMU (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy ...) have 
begun to rely more on fiscal policy to compensate for the lack of independence in conducting monetary 
policy. Practice has shown that the perceived fiscal discipline within the EMU does not exist and that 
some members have used their growing budget deficit and public debt over the so-called Maastricht 
criteria as a means to address not only their economic problems, but also to achieve the untamed 
appetites of the ruling structures. 
This confirms the conclusion that at the beginning of the functioning of EMU a way (output 
solution) to overcome the problems of a member country fallen into recession was much needed. The 
analyzes according to Nenovski (2002) show that even then an international tax policy and the policy of 
distribution of shared revenues through the growth of the EU budget, which would be used to overcome 
regional differences by conducting a policy of encouraging or limiting, was to be established. This will 
have satisfied the requirements of the member countries of the EMU and/or will have prevented the 
occurrence of high budget deficits and public debt which drew the European economy in 2010 in a so-
called debt crisis with serious threats to the future of the global economy. 
 
4. A political monetary union is not possible without a political union: Fiscal union or 
deteoriation of the European Union 
 
True and complete confidence in the EMU depends on the confidence in the various markets 
(goods, labor, and capital). And it is obvious that the member countries of the EMU can not react in 
different ways to economic shocks that come from inside or outside the EMU. The reasons for this are 
seen in different levels of economic development of the member countries, diversity in their tradition, 
culture, language etc... The enlargement of the European Union with countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe make the EMU more heterogeneous and complex. That, in turn, raises the question of the need 
for a political rapprochement between the member countries of the Union and what kind of political 
structure in the future will be created in Europe. 
Given the different traditions, divergent economic standards and the different political 
approaches to supranational political and economic structures in Western Europe, it is very difficult to 
find identical solutions for all the member countries. Problems that some countries increasingly face in 
the last 3-4 years point to the conclusion that it is impossible for the European integration to become a 
composition in which all coaches (countries - members) will move with the same speed. "Striking 
disparities in the development of certain regions of the EU is one of the key current issues that the EU 
should resolve as quickly as possible" (Arangelovik Z. et all., 2007).  
Since the early efforts for European monetary integration some controversies were present 
about the impact of national and supranational levels of political decision-making. In this respect, the 
discussions in some countries for (non) membership in the EMU (UK, Sweden, Denmark), have a long 
tradition. To overcome this problem the principle of subsidiarity in decision making might be a solution, 
but not sufficiently (Nenovski, 2002).  
Therefore, to be sustainable, the EMU must be part of a wider political integration of the 
member countries. In the first ten years of the functioning of the EMU attention had not been paid to 
that fact. That issue is becoming increasingly pressing in recent years, after it has become clear to all 
that devolution and fiscal sovereignty of member states in the structures of the EMU will allow its future 
perspective. 
The EU needs a strong common constitution that will specify the responsibilities of the different 
political levels: regional, national and supranational. It would be one of the possible ways of preventing 
a possible collapse of EMU in the future, as has happened with some other similar integration in the 
past. 
Namely, in the late 19th century, during the validity of the so-called gold standard, there were 
several currency unions. Among them was the Nordic or Scandinavian Union, which was without 
political unification, however, some time it functioned very well. Economic and political performance in 
the countries - members of the Union were virtually identical for a longer period. However, in the early 
years of the last century the member countries of the union turned to implementing various economic 
policies, which was the reason for the dissolution of that union (Nenovski, T., 2010). 
Politically speaking, long-term solution for the weak EMU is the creation of fiscal union or a 
genuine political federation. In this regard are the measures as proposed by the leading countries of the 
Union (Germany and France). They insist on changing the Lisbon treaty (some sort of EU constitution) in 
order to reduce the fiscal sovereignty of countries members of the EMU and the introduction of tax on 
financial transactions. 
The first would mean that the member state in EMU needs to strictly respect the Maastricht 
rules of conduct in relation to the size of its budget deficit, and thus gradually restore the public debt 
level up to 60 percent of its GDP. Otherwise, the Commission and any member state of the EMU could 
bring a complaint before the international courts and the EC to introduce a kind of "forced 
administration" on the specific disobeying country to control its fiscal finances. 
The latter would mean imposing a tax on financial transactions which in the early 1970s was 
advocated by the American Nobel laureate James Tobin (so-called "Robin Hood tax"). Under the 
proposal, trading in stocks and bonds would be taxed at a rate of 0.1 percent and transactions with so 
called financial derivatives will be taxed at a rate of 0.01 percent. It is estimated that the tax that will be 
collected annually will about 74 billion dollars that would be instilled in the fund for interventions to EC 
countries facing debt crisis. 
 
5. Regional groupings for protection aginst bad scenarios for the future of EU and EMU 
 
Once ignited the so-called debt crisis in the EU, imposed the following frequently asked 
questions are: 1) Will the EU survive, and 2) whether and to what it will be transformed? 
In order to answer these questions, the European dignitaries in late 2011 began to lead (finally) 
a political battle, basically, for saving the Union. The proposed measures previously discussed, should 
lead in that direction. However, even to ratify the amendments to the Lisbon treaty, it will mean easy 
and quick solution to political problems of countries - members of the EU. "Politically speaking, long-
term solution to the weak euro is creating a fiscal union or a genuine political federation. But it would be 
a solution for which the application of the same takes decades, a crisis that escalates each week" (Biznis, 
2011). It is a long time, in which there may be new challenges and uncertainties. That means a 
guarantee of reliability, stability and durability of the EU, will still not exist. 
It is well know by most of the existing member states. Moreover, they know that coming a long 
way is a possibility for new adverse scenarios whose realization would jeopardize their overall national 
interests and strategic objectives. Therefore, even now some of them are beginning to prapre the 
ground for their own protection against possible new adverse trends in the EU. Thus the Baltic and 
Visegrad group appeared and the Nordic Union was formed. 
Baltic group includes Letonija, Lithuania and Estonia. Those three countries are among the most 
recent EU members. Of them, only Estonia is a member of the EMU. It shows satisfactory overall 
political and economic performance. Its public debt was only 4.5 percent of its GDP, the lowest level of 
public debt among all countries in Europe. Because in the whole they are not getting what they 
expected from the EU and EMU, these countries do strategies for joint action aimed at their protection 
from any new turbulence in the EMU. 
The Visegrad group consists of Hungry, Checz, Poland and Slovakia, out of which only Slovakia is 
an EMU member. Since the beginning of the debt problems, officials increasingly emphasise that 
entering, or, remaining into the Euro zone has negative consequences for Slovak economy.  Although 
Poland is not a Euro sceptic, it postones its EMU membership with a great deal of caution, though, it 
may be said that Poland functions in such a way which was anticipated for whole EMU to function. 
Checz President very often states his attitude against the euro-concept, and Hungary faces many other 
serious economic problems which drag her away from EMU.  All in all, due to tradition and self-
protection from eventual future negative events in the Eurozone these countries tend to turn to their 
political and economic relations established by the Agreement of Vishegrad in 1991. 
If we take the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland), only Finland is a 
member of EMU. Occasional referendums in Denmark and Sweden confirm the animosity of the 
majority of their population for the euro. Norway is not a member of EU. In such conditions, and 
recalling the experience of their monetary union which was previously discussed, these countries are 
distancing from EMU, organizing loose alliance which should protect them from any new adverse event 
in the EMU. 
Great Britain saw a perfect opportunity in the crisis to weaken the Franco-German pillar of euro 
domination and took an aggressive stand to position itself as a carrier of an alternative European project 
based on euro skepticism.   
Although unofficially, the idea of a so-called Eurasian Union as a new and very broad and 
superior economic region is being advocated. The concept of Eurasia is based on trade relations, and not 
on ideology. It is imagined to be an economic union that would allow free movement of goods and 
capital across the borders of its Member States. It would include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Moldova, with an 
ample opportunity later to be joined by Turkey, Syria and Azerbaijan. Obviously it would be a huge 
market composed of countries that have proven to be more resistant in times of crisis. No wonder that 
this market each day is becoming more and more attractive to all western economies. It is particularly 
noticeable in Germany and France who, in difficult circumstances when faced with the economic crisis in 
the Union, all increasingly turning to the states that Russia, as a carrier of the idea, originally imagined 
them as members of a future Eurasian Union (Neshkova, K., 2012). 
 
6. Needs, opportunities and advantages of forming a Balkan Economic Union as a future 
member of the European Union 
 
It is obvious that the Balkans are absent from all political and economic events, and groupings in 
Europe. This is probably the reason for the more frequent and louder mentioning of the so-called Balkan 
Union in the world public, even in the administration of the leading countries in the world. Because the 
term union could mean a political union, which in this period is neither possible nor desirable (it reminds 
of the former Yugoslav federation), and due to the goals we want to achieve with its formation, 
probably a more suitable name for such association would be Balkan Economic Union (BEU).  All Balkan 
non-EU countries would participate in it: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo and Albania. It is possible for the Republic of Turkey to join it as well unless it joins the Eurasian 
Union. BEU would be created as a kind of protection from the global economic crisis, and from the 
shocks and misunderstandings inside the EU. It is estimated that: "none of the mentioned Balkan 
countries has the capacity to independently realize prosperity for its citizens. They all have small and 
barely competitive economies, weak and underdeveloped labor market, have outdated educational 
systems, etc." (Velinovska, M., 2011). 
With the current economic (non)development, these countries cannot expect to become EU 
members soon. Further efforts are needed to raise their level of economic development which will lead 
to achieving the ultimate goal - admission to the EU. The frequent messages from Brussels point to the 
need to: "create an economic union based on a Balkan free characterized by a close "cross-border 
"cooperation and loose political ties" (The Washington Times, 2003).  
Western Balkan countries should increase mutual trade, which will increase their economic 
growth, thereby increasing the amount of foreign investment in their economies. To achieve this goal, 
they need to establish a framework for trade cooperation. In fact, it means establishing a free trade 
zone in which these countries will trade without any restrictions. By applying the so-called diagonal 
accumulation which now operates under the CEFTA, those countries of the European market will export 
goods with regional prefix that will export goods that originate not from a particular country, but the 
free trade zone. Thus, the competitiveness of their products to European, and thus the global market 
will significantly increase. 
There are several reasons why the formation of BEU would be acceptable to the Western 
countries, and thus to the Republic of Macedonia. 
First, all these countries that would have entered the commercial zone, except for Albania and 
Turkey, emerged from the breakup of the Yugoslav economic integration where, before beginning the 
process of transition, they had based their development. With the dissolution of that federation, the 
market where these countries placed most of its product disappeared as well.  
Secondly, the Western Balkan countries are not optimal economic zones. Their own market 
capacity (excluding Turkey) is very small. By connecting the common trade area, a market of 100 million 
people will be created. Given the closeness to other countries in southeastern Europe, that market 
could increase to about 250 million people. This fact is especially important for significantly reducing the 
high unemployment rate in these countries, especially in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo. 
Thirdly, the process of European integration of these countries is very complex. Several factors 
can confirm that most of these countries are still not ready to accept the challenges of EU membership, 
especially in the realization of significant economic performance. Their average level of economic 
development is far behind the level of the economic development of the EU countries. This data can 
significantly slow down their European integration if positive things do not happen in their 
development. In that sense, linking the regional economic community is a complement to their 
integration into the global conglomerate - the EU. Indeed, the successful functioning of the BEU would 
be the best recommendation for acceptance of all its members in the EU in 5 to 6 years’ time. 
Fourthly, without a strong recognition sign (brand), the products of most of these countries 
show difficult competing scheme on the European market. The establishment of a regional regime of 
free trade will allow reduction of such weaknesses. 
Fifthly, after the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation and after the various wars on 
its territory, countries of Western Balkans feel alienated from one another. Most of them have 
significant higher trade with other countries than with their neighboring countries. 
Accordingly, there is a strong economic interest in unification and economic integration of the 
Balkan countries. An initial mutual free trade agreement should gradually become a customs union. 
Members of the regional economic community should have a common customs policy towards third 
countries. 
Economic cooperation could be further promoted by: forming a Balkan Exchange, concluding 
contracts for joint appearance on third markets, as well as conducting joint energy, tourism, agricultural 
and transport policy (Jovanovski, 2009), a joint organization of sports events of regional, European and 
globally frames, "forming a fund for economic assistance to Member States" (Domljan, V., 2008) more 
efficient use of the EU IPA fund, etc.  
 Besides economic, which seem to be major, BEU would have other benefits for its 
members. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, would finally become a functional state, political tensions in 
the region would be reduced and any possibility of secession of Republic of Srpska will be prevented; 
Serbia would solve its internal affairs and relations with Kosovo; Montenegro would solve the still open 
Serbian question, Macedonia would improve the quality of life; Albania would create major economic 
opportunities; Kosovo would finally be stabilized in the Balkan frames. Finally, BEU would create 
conditions for establishing a common security, social and educational policy, as well as policy of 
protection of human rights. 
However, to make this come to life, we need someone’s initiative. Will any of those countries, 
the Western Balkan countries, dare to take the first step? 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In the early 1950s the process of European integration began as a means of gradual economic 
and political reconstruction of Western Europe. It is a process which took 6.5 decades, constantly 
changing and adapting to the demands of the globalized world. In his new idea lies the need to establish 
multiculturalism in order to overcome the various nationalisms and reach economic prosperity and 
political harmony of the united countries. Fashioned in this manner, the EU should be (have been) the 
third equal partner of the global economic and political map – right in the middle between U.S. in the 
West and the former USSR, now Russia to the East. 
The wider European identity was deliberately based on a series of principles and above all, the 
idea of a single European economy that will connect all nations. It was considered that if the EU 
provided a basis for European prosperity, the continued existence of nations in Europe will be a threat 
for the EU and, perhaps, over time some nationalisms will “reduce” their intensity and the European 
identity will be strengthened. It was assumed that economic prosperity will lead to reduction of national 
tensions. In this function was the EMU formed, which in the long run displayed more advantages than 
disadvantages. However, over time, it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe is a lot more than just 
an integrated trade zone and its economies are far from homogeneous. Debt crisis revealed some more 
cracks in the European construction. It became clear to everyone that without political integration there 
can possibly be neither a monetary one, nor an overall economic union. 
Therefore, for its long-lasting, EMU must be part of a wider political integration of the countries 
- members. In other words, long-term solution for the now weak Euro is the creating of a fiscal union or 
a genuine political federation. However, this solution can take more years, given its daily growing size 
and the strength of the Euro crisis. That means that a guarantee for the reliability, stability and durability 
of the EU will be impossible to provide.  
In response to such uncertainties, some countries in Europe suit their own grouping in formal 
and informal alliances, which are supposed to represent some kind of preventive measures against 
possible future serious consequences of the (non) functioning of EMU. The Visegrad, Baltic and 
Scandinavian group of alliances were renewed. More and more frequently the establishment of so-
called Eurasian Union is mentioned, which should be led by Russia. From these events, the Balkan 
countries seem to be missing. Do they need to come together in a Balkan economic union? 
If we follow the example of other, wealthier and more experienced, then the answer to that 
question should be confirmative. With the formation of BEU there some kind of protection against the 
global economic crisis, as well as the economic shocks and incongruities within EU would be created. In 
addition to that idea is the fact that along with the ongoing economic (non)development, the Balkan 
countries should not hope for EU membership soon. Further efforts are needed to raise their level of 
economic development, which will bring about the ultimate goal - admission to the EU. 
BEU would be an economic union following the example of Benelux. It means absolute 
cooperation of the member states, primarily in the field of economics. Thus, the Western Balkans would 
become economical and not only geographical name, what it is at the moment. Indeed, the process of 
disintegration in the Balkans ended. A period begins when the economy will conquer politics. The 
possible formation of BEU as the vanguard of the integration of the Western Balkan countries into the 
EU could be a persuasive evidence. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the successful functioning of BEU would be the best 
recommendation for admission to all its member countries in the next 5 to 6 years. And without 
integration of the Balkan countries towards the EU can deem the process of the European unification 
completed. 
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